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. [So F. No. 18050 In Bank. Dec. 20. 1950.] 
CLIFTON HILDEBRAND et ai., Petitioners, v. THE STATB . 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. . '" 
';.1 
[IJ Atto111e,s-Grounds for DlsclpliDarr Action-Solicitation .r 
Employment.-Rule 2(a) of Rules of Professional Conduct,· 
forbidding solieitillg of employment, is violated by ·attOrn.~, 
who agree IlDder Ii plan with a uniop to render its memben°' 
service at a reduced rate in \;ontempIatioD of a I.t.rge vol ' .. 
of business resultiDg hom the union's recommendatioL of &heir 
employment. . 
[2&. 2b J Id. - Grounds for .allsciPlinarJ Action - Solicitation .,. 
Employment.-Attorneys violate rule 3 of Rules of Prof ... 
siODal Conduct, proscribing remuneration of another by an.· .. 
attorney for soliciting or obtaining professiona:I employmea\' 
for him aDd denounciDg an atto111ey's knowiDg acceptance Of.' 
!mpioyment as a re!Jillt of activities of an organization which 
influences such employment, althougb tJley operate under •. 
plan with a union providing for payment by the client undal: :. 
separate contracts of separate fees to the union and attorn.,.., :: 
where the union i!ncourages their employment by its meaibeil,·. 
and tbe two contracts constitute but one overa:Il transaction. ,. 
[3] 14. - Grounds for DisciPlinarJ Action - Solicitation of BID-
ployment.-It is Dot essentia:I to violation of ule 3 of Rulee . 
of Professional Conduct that the remuneration by an atto111ey -' 
of another for soliciting of employment be in mODey, but jn.'~ 
[1] See 9 Oal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. (1949 Rcv.) 485; 6 Am.Jur. 416. . 
• cX. D1&. Reference: i.l-4J At.torneys, i laG. 
1 
I 
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eludes the advantages accruing to Ii union under a plan which 
assures that its members' litigation will be handled by experi. 
enced attorneys at a reduced rate, and which eonstitute~ an 
inducing ~use for attracting union membership and payment 
of dues. 
[4] Id.-Grounds for Disciplinary Action-Solicitation of Employ-
ment.-Although, prior to a disciplinary proceeqing, attorneys 
have ceased operating under a plan with a union calling for 
a client's payment of separate fees to the union and to them-
selves, and have substituted an arrangellJent whereby the client 
pays only a single fee to the attorneys who pay the union'. 
investigators on :l. quantum meruit hasis, such substitution will 
Dot release them from uccountability for their prior conduct, 
particularly where the union's channeling of employment to 
them continues. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disciplinary 
action against three attorneys. Proceeding dismissed. 
Clifton Hildebrand, in pro. per., and Sheridan Downey, 
Jr., for Petitioners. 
Eugene D. Williams and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
, 
THE COURT. - Petitioners are attorneys, Hildebrand 
having been admitted to practice in 1925, Bills in 1923.1 and 
McLeod in 1935. By this proceeding they seek a review of 
the recolnmendation of the Board of Governors of The State 
Bar that they be disciplined for the violation of rule 2, 
section a (commonly known as the "solicitation to rule) and 
rule 3 (generally referred to as the "ambulance chasing" 
rule) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of The State Bar 
of California. (26 Cal.2d 32.) The disciplinary action arose 
out of petitioners' representation of injured railroad men on 
claims against railroad companies, pursuant to a contract with 
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen designating them as 
regional counsel for the Brotherhood-Hildebrand having 
acted alone in such capacity beginning in 1933, then joined 
by Bills sometime prior to 1940, and by McLeod in 1942. 
By the notice to show cause petitioners were charged with 
41 separate acts of solicitation of professional employment; 
a general "conspiracy" for the purpose of soliciting and 
obtaining employment as attorneys, including the employ. 
ment of others to procure such employmrnt for them, with 
"runners and cappers" actillg for thew ill violation of section 
I 
I 
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182 of the Penal Code. and "dividing ... attorneys' 
with persons not attorneys," and "knowingly accepting . 
professional employment" offered to them as an incident 
the activities of such persons; and specific instances of 
pf'nsation of certain named persons not licensed to practice 
law for their solicitation of employment on behalf of 
titioners. 
Petitionf'rs filed a written answer in denial of an the 1!1l'~"''''''''_ 
and in addition urged as affirmative defenses: (1) 
procef'dillg was "brought to serve private purposes and n .. ;i~ .. ·t .. -·-":1 
spites" of the railroad companies (Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 
47 [17 P.2d 112) ; Burke v State Bar, 218 Cal. 143 [21 P.2d· 
577) ; Herrscker v. State Bar, 4 Cal.2d 399 [49 P.2d 832]); 
and (2) that petitioners' methods of practice and activities 
had been approved by decisions from this and other juris-
dictions. (Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 816 [117 P.2d 
860) ; Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 268 Ill.App. 364; In ,.6 .) 
Seidman. 228 App.Div. 515 [240 N.Y.S. 592].) .1' j" 
Nu~erous hea.rings were held before the local administrat.ive. . .•..
commIttee runmng from May througb August, 1948. durIng . 
the course of which an amendment was made to the notice . 
to show cause whereby (1) the "conspiracy" count--w88, 
expanded to include specific reference to petitioners' accept-j 
ance of "professiona] employment" as "incident to the .ac:.-.j 
tivities . . . of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,an 
association that for compensation. controlled,· directed. and 
influenced such employment"; and (2) a new count was. 
added describing the legal aid services rendered by the 
Brotherhood to its injured members and petitioners' connec-
tion therewith. Following petitioners' denial of these later 
added charges at the subsequent hearings, and argument and 
submission of the matter, the committee on December 1, 1948, 
made findings and conclusions adverse to petitioners. In this 
regard it will suffice to say that the committee sustained the 
charges of petitioners' soH citation of professional employ-
ment in more than 20 separate cases; petitioners' compen-
sation of some six persons acting as "runners" or "cappers," 
and as their agents. in obtaining employment for them; and 
petitioners' knowing acceptance of employment through the 
legal aid services of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
in directing the handling of injury claims by its members 
against the railroads. Upon such findings the committee 
recommended suspension from practice of the law for varying 
DI'r..19liO] HILDEBRAND v. STATE BAR 
(38 c.Jd 1M; 225 P.24 1081 
pI-nods against petitioners-Hildebrand for four years. Bills 
fur two years, and McLeod for one year. 
Thereafter the record was submitted to the Board of Gov-
t'rllors, which body. after full argument and consideration 
or the matter. made its own findings affirming substantially 
thp conspiracy and solicitation findings of the 'committee both 
as to petitioners' procurement of professional employment 
through the activities of individuals operating as u runners" 
or "cappers" for petitioners. as well as through the con-
tractual undertaking with the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men. However, in passing upon the separate eharges of solici-
tation, the Board of Governors stated that such instances of 
alleged misconduct "dissociated from {the J basie arrange-
ment" with the Brotherhood and "standing alone" would fail 
.. to make out a case of solicitation" in that "in practically 
t'\'ery such case, standing alone, there was either a proper 
rt'fereIice or a proper contact made by the attorneys within 
the holdings of cases such as Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 
2d 8]6 [117 P.2d 860]," and it "is only when these individual 
cases are viewed in the light of their relationship to the 
central arrangement and in the light of the evidence bearing 
upon the charges of conspiracy . . . that they acquire signifi-
cance. " With sqch limitation of the controlling factor in 
this disciplinary proceeding against petitioners, and after 
a detailed recital of the prevailing contraetual arrangement 
between petitioners and the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men whereby the latter "channeled;' the injury cases of its 
members to petitioners for prosecution, the Board of Governors 
concluded that petitioners were "guilty ... of violations of 
Rule 2, section a, and Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct" but reduced the degree of discipline to be imposed 
upon petitioners according to the following recommendation 
-that "Hildebrand be suspended from the practice of the 
law ~ •. for a period of four months" and that "Bills and 
• . . McLeod be publicly reproved by the Court." 
It appears from a full examination of the record berein 
that the Board of Governors properly narrowed the funda-
mpntal issue of professional misconduct to petitioners' par-
ticipation in the basic plan of the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen in providing legal services for its members. Ac-
cordingly, the basic plan must be carefully analyzed with 
respeet to its operation and effect in relation to the particular 
Hules of Professional Conduct here involved. 
) 
-'--
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Rule 2, section a, reads: "A member of. The State Bar 
not solicit professional employment by advertisement or 
wise." (26 Cal.2d 32.) Rule 3, so far as here neli:inAl 
provides: "A member of The State Bar shall not Amnt,,"'!Jj 
another to solicit or obtain, or remunerate another for so]lcdit;.~ 
ing or obtaining, professional employment for him; 
except with a person licensed to practice law, shall he dil'Mtlv:iJl 
or indirectly share compensation arising out of or tnf~ld.~'n~~:~ 
to professional employment; nor . . . ~owingly accept' 
fessional employment offered to him as a result of ora. 
incident to the activities of any person .not so lieensed or 
any association or corporation that for compensation CO]lm~1a. 
directs or influences such employment ..• " (26 Cal.2d. 
There is no conflict in the evidence concerning the 
plan. It appears that in 1930 the Brotherhood of Railroad·~ 
Trainmen established a Legal Aid Department as a service ';1 
to its members and their families in procuring lawyersu:". 
perienced in personal injury law to prosecute damage ~1aim1 
against the railroad companies, at eharges which would be;' 
somewhat less than the usual percentage of contingent feea,"~: 
in such cases. Regional counsel was designated ineaeli .. 
territorial zone, and the employment of such counsel"';' 
urged or -stronglYl'ecommended to tlleuiJur mem ers an.:, 
their families. As part of this Legal Aid Department,there', 
was also established an investigation service withinvestigatoii(~~ 
~igned to report on ~efa.cts of an accid. e~t case and obtahi .. · ..... ~.; ... 
eVldence thereon pertment to the presentatIon of the ~: 
claims. ,,' .-'! 
The plan originally called for a written contract on a 2Q" 
per cent contingent fee basis, with the agreement on the pan. '......• ] •...•. i 
of the attorney to turn over one-fourth of that amount, or.~. 
5 per cent, to the Brotherhood for maintenance of the Legal; 
Aid Department. Contracts were to be executed direct1yj' ,
between the designated regional counsel and the injured ~.'. 
claimants on forms approved by the Legal Aid DepartmeIlt, ,; 
and such counsel was required to advance all necessary court) 
costs, expert witness fees, expense of medical examinations, J" 
and like expenditure items. These expenses were to be de-
ducted from the amount of recovery before a division woul~ 
be made of the net sum between the lawyers and the claimants. j 
As here pertinent in the time period involved, Hildebrand, : 
who had been acting alone as r<>gional counsel in this state 
for the Brotherhood ~inc<> 19~1. was joined in the enterprise 
by Bills sometime prior to l!I·HllUld by McLeod in 1942; and , 
) 
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together they undertook by contractual arrangement W1th 
tbe Brotherhood to render legal services to its members in 
pursuance of the basic plan. Meanwhile it appears that a 
change was made in the contingent fee provisions 80 that 
the claimant was required to sign two contracts covering an 
aggregate contingent fee of 25 per cent-onecontract calling 
for 19 per cent to the attorney for legal services and the 
other for 6 per cent to the Brotherhood for the maintenance 
/)r the Legal Aid Department, with its investigating service. 
Then as of June 15, 1946, this fee procedure was superseded 
under an arrangement with the Brotherhood permitting the 
attorneys to handle the cases on a fiat 25 per cent basis but 
requiring them to pay the investigators, members of the 
Brotherhood's sta1f, on a quantum meruit basis for their 
services. 
[1] A realistic appraisal of this basic plan compels the 
conclusion that it offended recognized standards of profes-
sional conduct in providing the means whereby solicitation 
of the employment of petitioners was effected on a wholesale 
basis in violation of rule 2, section a. While the members 
of the Brotherhood were not· compelled to employ regional 
-eounsel for the handling of their lawsuits, they were subject 
to continuous an~ strong recommendation from the Brother-
hood to do so through its journal publications and circulars 
to the members, as well as by personal visits from officers 
of the Brotherhood locals advising the injured railroad men 
and their families to avail themselves of the benefits furnished 
by the Legal Aid Department, embracing selected investi. 
gating and legal services. The compensation to be received 
by regional counsel for their representation of injured rail-
road men or their families was all predetermined according 
to the basic plan with the Brotherhood, and the client's sign-
ing of the contracts calling for legal and investigating services 
on the 19 per cent and 6 per cent contingent fee basis was 
no more than a ratification of the Brotherhood's arrangement 
with the designated regional counsel. There is no question 
from the record but that petitioners knew exactly how their 
professional employment by injured railroad men was being 
solicited for them through the Brotherhood's activities, and 
they were willing to perform the desired legal services at 
a substantially reduced contingent fee rate in the belief 
that the volume of business to be directed to thf'm through 
such solicitation would warrant such financial consideration. 
510 
From such aspect it is apparent that the solicitation in 
had its "origin in the mindls] of" petitioners 
the common course of action arranged with the Hriotlilerllloci~jl 
(see People v. Levy, 8 Cal.App.2d Supp. 763, 769 [50 
509]), and as parties to such agreement, petitioners 
be held accountable for the results of tbeir participation-
the preconceived general scheme. 
[2a] Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct., 
expressly proscribes the remuneration by an attorney 
another for "soliciting or obtaining professional employment 
for him," and likewise denounces an attorney's knowing 
acceptance of employment as a result of the "activities of •• ~' 
any association or corporation that for compensation controls,' 
directs or influences such employment." It is clear from the 
record that the Brotherhood has been remunerated and com· 
pensated for soliciting, directing and influencing the em· 
ployment of petitioners by its members. In the first place 
for its participation in the common course of action, it appears 
that the Brotherhood under the two-contract contingent fee 1 
arrangement-the 6 per cent allowance for investigation and ..• 
the 19 per cent allowance for legal services, which was the" 
procedure followed for a great deal of the time here .-, 
tinent-discharged a sizable deficit ($100,000) which had 
accrued over the years in the beginning of the Legal. Aid . 
Department's operations when the investigating services were 
furnished free to the members, and, in addition, built up. 
reserve of "approximately $80,000.00." [3] But further-
more, it cannot be said that the reference to remuneration 
and compensation in rule 3 envisages only the receipt of 
money as distinguished from other advantages or benefits 
that may accrue from an employment undertaking as is here 
involved. Thus (1) it was a matter of concern to the Brother· 
hood that the lawsuits of its injured members be handled by 
experienced lawyers, and the basic plan with petitioners was 
designed to provide legal services for its members at what 
might be termed "wholesale rates"; and (2) such service 
would reasonably constitute an inducing cause for attracting 
membership in the Brotherhood and the payment of dues 
thereto. In the light of these considerations, it appears in~ 
disputable that the ethical standards envisaged by rule 8, 
supra, have been violated by petitioners. 
[2b] Petitioners argue that the Brotherhood's Legal Aid 
plan has been approved by judicial decision, citing Ryan v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co. (Ill. 1932), 268 lll.App. 364. In that 
J)ee.1950] lIn.DEBlU.ND tI. STATE BAa 
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case a regional attorney for the Brotherhood sought to assert· 
a lien for professional service, based upon a contingent fee 
contract of 20 per cent executed with the injured railroad man, 
where the railroad company had secretly settled with the 
client. The railroad company contended that such retainer 
embodied an illegal contract (1) not only in that the pro-
fessional employment had been solicited by the Brotherhood 
(2) but also in the fee-splitting feature inherent in the arrange-
ment in that the· compensation for the attorney was in reality 
only 14 per cent and the remaining 6 per cent was to go to the 
Brotherhood as its share of the damage recovery. The contract 
in question was upheld by the appellate court of Illinois for . 
the purpose of the attorney's lien, and accordingly the attor-
ney was awarded 20 per cent of the amount of the settlement. 
It is true that in reaching such decision, the court . fully 
detailed the "organized plan" in its operative e:lfect upon reo 
gional counsel's undertaking personal injury cases for mClll:-
bers of the Brotherhood, but such examination of thc coordi-
nated activity of the Brotherhood and regional counsel was 
correlated with the processes of the Legal Aid Department .aR 
a service feature to the Brotherhood's members in securin~ 
legal services at a minimum fee coincident with the competent ..... 
investigation of reported injury claims....Inso~ussing tht> '" 
facts from the standpoint of the benefits a:lforded the Brother:---'---'"'!· ~r!:"". ---/ 
'hood and its members in the assertion of their legal rights . 
rather than from the standpoint of the proprieties of the law" 
yer in maintaining professional standards, the· Illinois· court 
concluded that it uwould not be justified in holding that the 
contract on which the [attorney's] claim is based 'was secured 
by unlawful and unethical solicitation and fee-splitting.'" . 
(P.379.) 
The distinct premise of the Ryan decision is precisely noted 
in the case of In re O'Neill (Dist. Ct., E.D. N. Y., 1933), 5 F. 
Supp. 465, a disciplinary proceeding for the alleged infraction 
of the ethic8l standards of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion relative to "stirring up litigation." There in passing 
upon the Brotherhood's basic arrangement with regional 
counsel for the handling of injury claims of Brotherhood 
members, the court noted that "during the progress of [thE' I 
proceeding" the original contingent fee arrangement between 
"the [attorney], his client, and the Brotherhood" (callin~ 
for a single contract for a20 per cent fee with the attorney. 
who' 'turned over one-quarter [thereof] to the Brotherhood") 
.as · 'somewhat altered in form-as the result of an intimation 
J 
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judicially imparted at preliminary bearing-so that now 
[attorney] procures two contracts, one to secure hie 11 
cent. contingent fee. and the other whereby the client' 
ploys the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood" 
the investigating work on. his claim, and "agree[s] •. 
pay it. in accordance with its plan, 5 per cent. of the net _."'""",,:.l1li 
ment, verdict or recovery." (P. 467.) With regard to 
. oRteosiblt! change in the contractual relations of the D8.1~L"" 
tbe court pertinently continued at page 467: "We ean _, ..... _ 
difference in principle between theose of two contracta 
one, where the purpose is to secure for the BrotherhoOa 
quarter of the contingent fee as a·contribution to the _t-.;1lIIi 
Aid Department of which the investigator is a re]~reBeJllta1tm';· 
Then after noting the further professional standard of 
New York State Bar Association declaring that the " 
monal services of a lawyer should not be controlled or 
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which .lll.UI7r."= 
venes between client and lawyer" and so destroys the 1 .. + .... ' .. 
independence of function with the former, the court reieatAMI 
the attorney's claim that .. thE' practice in question "miiht 
be justified "because of what was written in the case of Rff-
v. The Pennsylvania Bat'lroad Co.," with this 
(pp. 467-468): "The basis of rthat1 decision was that 
-eGntract was not contrary to public policy, and that the 
Brotherhood was engaged in rendering an enlightened seniee . 
to its members . . . [but that] is not the question upon which. 
this court has to pass, which has to do only with the infraction: . 
of its rules. . . . tt is our conclusion that the [attorney 'Ii] . 
unprofessional conduct as indicated has been clearly estab- . 
lished, and invites the censure of the court, which is hereb)r . 
recorded. " . 
Petitioners argue that the contingent fee arrangements here 
made between the parties are not vulnerable to the prevailing 
objection in the O'Neill case because the contract in favor of .' 
the Brotherhood for 6· per cent of the net recovery was 1're-
&ented to the client not by the attorney but by a represent&- . 
tive of the Brotherhood, so that the attorney concerned him-
self only with his own contract for the 19 per cent allowance. 
In fact, petitioners admit that this new procedure in handling 
the two contracts was adopted as the result of the discussion 
and criticism expressed in the 0 'Neill case. But the censur-
able premise of the divided contingent fee contract remained 
the same. There waR no rhanllt> in thE' RUbstance of fhe entire 
transaction as emanating. from the Brotherhood '. Legal Aid 
l 
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Department for the coordinated purpose of supplying to the 
members the services of investigators and legal counsel. Con. 
tracts for the two services were made dependent.one upon the 
other, for, aecording to the record, petitioners were unable to 
cite any instance' where the injured' member ever executed a 
contingent fee contract with the Brotherhood for the investiga-
t,ion of his ease and yet did not at substantially the same time 
execute a contingent fee contract for legal representation. In 
flbort, the two contracts constituted but one overall transaction 
involving the division of compensation between regional coun-
8e1 and the Brotherhood as a fee-splitting device contrary to 
rule 3· of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the require-
ment that an attorney dissociate himself in his professional 
employment from control by a lay intermediary or organiza-
tion. 
Petitioners claim that their conduct was approved by this 
court in the ease of Hildebrand v. State Bar (1941),18 Cal.2d 
816 [117 P.2d 860], where a "charge of solicitation of pro-
fl'ssional employment" made against petitioner Hildebrand, 
urting as regional counsel in the representation of an injured 
railroad man under the'auspices of the Brotherhood's Legal 
Aid Department, was dismissed as not "sufficiently supported 
h~' the evidence"-tht so-called"Bishop Matter." (pp. 830,., 
~:l4, ) A reading of that opinion, however, clearly. shows that 
tli" disciplinary issue there resolved related only to alleged 
lIliRconduct as correlated with the charge of solicitation of the 
·,nl' case in question, and did not purport to pass 11pon the 
!!('nE'ral charge of Usolicitation of professional employment" 
pursuant to the basic plan of the Brotherhood in procuring its 
memhers to employ designated regional counsel as part of the 
services rendered by the Legal Aid Department. As so dis-
tinguished, the Hildebraud ease is not a judicial determination , 
of the precise disciplinary consideration here argued-the 
propriety of petitioners' contractual relationship with the 
Brotherhood as a part of the basic service plan of the Legal 
Aid Department to its members, when attacked as a general 
overall solicitation of legal employment contrary to established 
nrofessional standards. 
{4] There is no merit to petitioners' further claim that any 
fep.splitting criticism to which the divided contingent fee eon-
traet might be subject is 110 longer a factor for consideration 
here. since that arrangement was 8llperseded in .Tune. ]946. 
by the mngle contractual stipulation of a 25 per cent conlin-
_C.»-n 
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gent fee running wholly in favor of the attorney, who 
therefrom the Brotherhood's investigators on a UUj:JftJUIlt 
"uit basis. Obviously, in the determination of this dis,cip:liDI 
proceeding petitioners must be held accountable for 
ti('!'lI which existed during the period that they were CDI~IIIJ~ 
with misconduct. Moreover, under both situations as 
:llTllngements the general "channeling" of legal work to 
'H.np1'!l continued as a prevailing procedure embraced in. 
IIrotherhood's undertaking with petitioners. Likewise--tm.m&.-'I 
IPria1 is the fact that as of October 15, 1949. petitioner 
Immd's appointment as "regional counsel for the BrIDthler~;l 
hood of Railroad Trainmen" was canceled and tex'JDina'teil.,1 
While there may no longer be a "basic contractual arr'8lUre-)\ 
ment" with the Brotherhood as a present disciplinary 
lem it is petitioners' prior actions as heretofore discussed 
must be examined in the light of the charge of pr()fel!SloUl 
misconduct. Nor does the worthiness of the Legal Aid Depart-
ment as an enterprise established by the Brotherhood to riD;'] 
der valuable services to its members in providing the meaDl: 
for appropriate presentation of their damage claims (I,. ;.~'. 
O'Nc,al, 81.tpra, 5 F.Supp. 465) or the manner in which the' 
charge of misconduct on .t. he part of. petitioners w~ mad.e 1Q .. ".'.: 
-nle--StateJ3arobscure the essential issue of petitioners'~ . 
leged violation of profesSional standards by reason of their. 
participation in the basic plan of the Brotherhood as a generalJ 
scheme for the SOlicl.·tation of professional employment amour ....•.. :.·.1~ •.....•. members of the Brotherhood. ..:;;:. 
Petitioners' acts as here assailed in relation to rule 2, ,180':: 
tion a, and rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 81.tpt'II,: 
cannot be condoned as consistent with the ethical proprieties .• 
exacted of members of the bar in this state. However, in view.i 
of the somewhat divergent implications found in the cited 1 
eases concerning the Brotherhood's basic plan, and in the 
absence of any prior decision in this state holding that it was .i 
improper for petitioners to participate in such a plan in thel 
manner above described, it is our conclusion that the ends of '1. 
justice will be served by dismisSing the present proceeding i 
without disciplinary action, thereby permitting this opinion,! 
as the first expression of the views of this court upon the : 
subject, to serve prospectively as a guide to the members of ; 
the profesSion generally, rather than to serve retrospectively 
to the detriment of petitioners. 
The proceeding is dismissed. 
) 
Dee. 1950] HILDEBRAND tJ.;STATE BAR 
(36 C.2d &Of: Z3I P.2d 608] 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
615 
I concur in the judgment of dismissal, but dissent from 
the holding of the majority that petitioners have violated 
rule 2, section (a) and rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Con-
fluet of The State Bar of California. 
Before discussing the mode of operation of the Brotherhood 
and petitioners with reference to the legal aid services here 
iD\"olved, it is necessary to examine the background that led 
to tlle arrangement between them. It appears that the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen is an organization of railroad 
l'Dlployees. Those employees agreed that it was advisable to 
provide some means whereby they could more efficiently handle 
rases of railroad workmen who were injured in the course of 
their work. Such claims are certainly not "damage actions" 
in an ordinary sense for they arise under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act of Congress (45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.). 
That act was designed for the protection of railroad employees 
engaged in interstate commerce who otherwise were left to 
common law remedies which were wholly inadequate. This 
act filled the need that workmen's compensation acts accorded 
to other workingmen and is buttressed by the Safety Appliance 
Act of Congress (45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.). These acts, how-
ever, lack tlie informality of procedure characteristic of the 
workmen's compensation acts, . as the claims arising thereunder 
are prosecuted in the courts rather than before a commission 
and, hence, qualified counsel, . as well as competent inveSti-
gators, are'indispensible. The Brotherhood here involved is 
an organization composed of the persons who are protected by 
the Federal Employers Liability Act. supra, and their em-
ployers are subject to its provisions. Hence there is a mani-
fest community of· interest between the employees and their 
organization, which justifies the latter in the procurement of 
legal and investigation services. all of which directly ties in to 
the rights and remedies established by the Federal Employers 
Liability Act. Thus, we do not have a case where the purpose, 
motive and result is the stirring up or exciting of litigation. 
Nor do we have a situation where hirelings are used to obtain 
clients for an attorney who would otherwise have no contact 
with them. Much less is there any splitting of fees or know-
ingly obtaining clients for a compensation. It is nothing more 
than a proper joining of forces for the accomplishment of a 
proper legal objective of mutual protection. 
The arrangement between petitioners and the Brotherhood 
at the time pertinent as outlined by the majority opinion is 
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that the Brotherhood and petitioners agreed that: the lat1_~1II 
were to be counsel for a certain geographical m;ea and 
available to handle cases for employee claimants-members 
the Brotherhood who suffered industrial injuries in that 
For that service, the contract with the claimant was 
agreeing to pay 6 per cent of any recovery to the J:S1'OTJIle1'ltlOOlll 
for its investigation services, and the other to pay, 19 per 
to petitioners as their fee for handling the prospective 
to recover on the claim. The Brotherhood urged its members 
to take advantage of the service, although they _ere not 
quired to do so, and petitioners knew that the niembers ' 
so urged. ,," 
If such a plan subjects the attorney with whom the arrange.. , , 
ment is made to disciplinary action for solicitation, as, thlD. 
majority holds, then a rule has been established that will have' 
morp rar reaching effects than any ever before stated by this 
court. The ramifications are innumerable. The rule ,will' 
apply to other professional fields where a similar arrangemettt 
must be held to constitute solicitation and, therefore, forbid-
den. Merely scratching the surface uncovers the universal 
provision of liability insurance policies under which t11e, in~; 
, _, ___ .!.':!!!r agrees t~~~_~<!_.!he 5l!~!,~~_~n~8!ly'legal ac.tio.n, -
under such a policy and retains control over' th_t Htii ..... tinn 
including the employment of an attorney. The tees of 
ilttorneyare -paid 'by tlietnsurer' our ~oflhe premiums ~,' "~r.-'l 
-ceives from the insured. Tht insurer advertises for and . 
solicits business-the sale of its policies. It would be folly to 
suggest that the attorneys employed by such insu\-ers do not 
know that such is the practice. and it is common knowledge 
that some attorneys. whilt not on a salary-employee'basis with 
the insurer. have an arrangement whereby they are regularly 
retained to defend tht insurer's insured. The situation ill 
not distingUishable from the instant ease except possibly it 
may be said that this is a stronger case from the standpoint 
of professional ethics. Is this court going to discipline 
attorneys who art employed by insurance companies torepre~ 
sent their insured' 
Reference may also be had to legal aid bureaus for indigent 
persons. Such bureaus. urgE' the nse of the services offered. 
and the attorney rendtrinl!' tht flervice knows of such soliei-
tation, yet no ont q1itstions the practice. True, the attorney 
may give his time without eharge, but practicing law free is 
nevertheless practicing law. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that such state-wide i 
/ 
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organizations as contractors' associations, merchants'. associa· 
tions, cattlemen's associations, etc., employ attorneys to repre-
sent such organizations and furnish advice to individual 
members of such organizations on matters of general and com-
mon interest, and that under the arrangement between these 
organizations and the attorneys employed by them, such at-
toru!'ys handle cases for individual members of such organi-
zations who may be referred to such attorneys by representa-
tives of such organizations on a fee arrangement agreed upon 
between such organization and the attorneys so employed, and 
if the problem involved in any such case is of general or com-
mon interest to the members of the organization, the latter 
will pay a portion if not all of the fee and expenses incident 
to the handling of such a case. It is obvious that under such 
an arrangement the representative of such organization solicits 
the member to take his case to the attorney for the organiza-
tion, and the representative of the organization is paid out 
of funds derived from the contributions of members thereof. 
This is a common practice and I have never heard of its being 
attacked as unethical or a violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct of The State Bar of California. Under the rule 
announced in the majority opinion, any attorney employed by 
such an organization who accepts employment from a member 
of . such organization, who was referred to such attorney by 
the paid representative of such organization. would be guilty 
of unprofessional conduct and subject to discipline for a viola-
tion of the rule of professional conduct here involved. 
In the medical practice field we have such organizations as 
the Ross-Loos plan (25 Cal.L.Rev. 95) where doctors have 
joined in a plan to give medical care for persons at a fixed 
amount. Patient members of such a plan are probably so-
licited. There are countless other such arrangements. (See 
California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790 
[172 P.2d 4,167 A.L.R. 306J.) Colleges and universities com-
monly supply medical care for their students and a fee is 
charged therefor. The attendance of such students may have 
been solicited. 
The application of the rule announced in the majority 
opinion will destroy all of the foregoing plans and systems, 
as well as many others. I cannot believe that the rules of 
ethical conduct have any such purpose or design. The essen-
tial object of the instant plan is not to obtain clients for an 
attorney. It. is to enable the organization (the Brotherhood) 
to assist its members in a matter of vital concern to them. 
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It does not urge its members to avail themselves of the ier-
vices in order to bring business to the counsel, or to "stir up" 
litigation. It is a method by which an attorney may be 
employed at a lesser fee, one whose special qualifications are 
previously determined. Certainly the attorney is not solicit-
ing business any more than would an attorney who agreed to 
represent a whole group of persons. The Brotherhood is not 
soliciting for him. It does not care whether he gets business 
and profits thereby. It IS primarily concerned with assisting 
its members or, phrased otherwise, it is nothing more than 
a group of persons who are interested in protecting themselves-
in the event of injury. It is merely incidentalthat in so doing 
a benefit results to the attorney. 
The entire field must be examined in this matter rather 
than summarily brushing aside many organizations and ar-
rangements which are serving a definite social need. The 
needs and policy underlying the plan of the Brotherhood are 
very pertinent. The majority opinion states: "Nor ,does the 
wOTthiness of the Legal Aid Department as an enterprise es-
tablished by the Brotherhood to render valuable services to its ' 
members in providing the means for appropriate presentation 
of their damage claims . . . obscure the essential issue of 
petitioners' alleged violation of professional standards by 
reason of their participation in the basic plan of the Brother-
hood ao; a genera] scheme for thE' solicitation of professional. 
employment among members of the Brotherhood." I cannot 
agree with the foregoing declaration, as it must be remembered 
that here the court is not applying a legislative enactment' 
over wht·ch it has no control and with the wisdom of which it 
cannot be concerned. On the contrary, it is supreme in the 
field of attorney-disciplinary matters. (Brydonjack v. State 
Bar, 208 Cal. 439 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507] ; 9 Ca1.Jur. 
10-Yr.Supp., Practice of Law, §§ 4,40-42.) It is not merely 
mf!chanically interpreting and applying a rule of ethics over I 
which it cannot concern itself. Indeed, it is its duty to exam-
ine into the wisdom of the rule, and observe its effect under 
various circumstances. Particularly it is bound to consider 
the scope of its application and all the questions of policy 
necessarily involved in such process. Certainly this court 
should not blind itself to the situation existing with respect 
to the plight of the injured railroad workmen who may be 
ignorant of their rights and f1\l1 ,·iC'tlms to lay claims agents 
of railroad eompanif'R who are bound by no rules of ethics 
or professional conduct. 
/ 
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In endeavoring to meet the contt'J1tioll tbllt ,. violation of 
the rule requires that the solicitor (the Brotht'rhond) receive 
compensation for its solicitation. the majority Rtates: .. (1) it 
was a matter of concern to the Brotherhood thaI thf' IIIWl'Illits 
of its injured members be handled by expf'rien{~t>d law~·.·~. and 
the basic plan with petitioners wa!~ rlf'si/!llpd to proVll1t' lpl!'al 
.scM'ices for its members at wbat mil!'bt bp tt>rmf'd 'wholf'sale 
rates' j and (2) such service would reasonably (>onl'l1ill1tf' an 
indu('ing cause for attracting membf'l'Rhip in fbI:' Brothprhood 
and the payment of dues thereto." An ohviollS anRWer to that 
argument is that those benefits were not rf>ef>ivf>f1b~' the 
Brotherhood for obtaining clients for pe.titioner.~ Tbt>y were 
received as the incidt>nt of the plan to provide competent legal 
services for its members. 
The authorities support the proposition that tht> arrange-
ment here considered violates no mIt> of profMl!o;ional f'tbies. 
In Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co .. 268 Ill.App 864. the same 
plan was involved. Contrary to the majority opinion. the 
basis of that case wa.' flot that the contract for affnrflP-Y8' fee. 
was flot against public policy. Thf' ('on tract was held valid 
because there was no breach of ethics by the otforfley. The. 
court, after outlining the BrothprhClod'f\ plan. statt>d: "Re-
spondent contends that" 't~e apppl1(>Ei"iRnot'flltitled10 -an 
attorney's lien bectl1tse the contract on which his claim is ba.lled 
was secured by "nlaw/ttl and 'U7IethieaZ!!n1;df(lfin1l (lnd fee-
,plitting,' that 'the proof showed that thE'l'P was a wen organ-
b:ed plan or scheme by which apppBf'f' Attorney JosE'ph D. 
Ryan obtained many personal injury ('al'OPS through the solici-
tation of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trsinmpn Rnd its in-
vestiJmtors,' and that 'it is clear that RpppllE'E' Ryan obtained 
the Meadows case through the unlawful anel unE'thical solici-
tation by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its 
investigators'; that it 'can see no dift'erf'n(>t> fl'om tht> Mand-
point of legality and ethies between anindivielnal ambulance 
chaser soliciting personal in';ury claims. and a corporation Rnd 
its investigators investigating the ca8t>R of proposed claimants 
and influencing said claimants to rt>tain their Rf>l!'iona] Coun-
sel.' After a careful consideration of all the faets we are 
satisfied that these eOfitefltionll and Rl'smmt>nts are withont 
merit, and we feel impellf'd to Sfly that ,h,. (llI!Iertion that the 
Brotherhood. through ,f!! legal lIid department. '$I okin tn an 
ambulance chaser tlnd that the petitioner "'(111 0 benefi,citJry 
of a71 uflethieal and tlfl.la'IJIfll·l !!'lstP.m nf n'hfni"i"" clients. is 
unworthy of 'ke able lawye~B who made it. The Brotherhood 
I' 
i 
j 
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is a lahor organization, composed of men engaged in h8.l!lllr,dotl. 
occupations and who are banded together for mutual protec-
tion and advancement. The evidence establishes that it or- . 
ganized the legal aid department for the sole purpose of pro- .' 
teeting its injured members or their families in the matter of ,,' 
claims growing out of injuries sustained in the course of" 
employment. Tbe argument that the legal aid department 
was a solicitation scheme by which petitioner 'obtained many. 
personal injury cases' is a most unfair one and entirely un-
warranted under the evidence. The evidence, introduced b.Y.' 
respondent, shows clearly the worthy purpose of the depart- . 
ment and the necessity for its organization and maintenance. 
The instant case is an illustration of its benefit to the members 
, . . Such an arrangement was not unethical." [Emphasis 
added.] 
In re O'Neill, (Dist. Ct. E.D.N.Y., 1933) 6 F.Supp. 465, 
misinterprets the Ryan case, and fails to give consideration to 
the true nature of the plan. 
Finally, there is no splitting of fees under the plan. The 
contract for the 6 per cent for investigation fee runs to the 
Brotherhood. The attorney bas nothing to do with it. To 
assume that it is part of his fee is contrary tQ the facts. . The 
situation is no different than if each member would execute 
a contract with the Brotherhood that in the event he used the 
services of the Brotherhood at any time in the future he would . 
pay therefor 6 per cent of his recovery. In either case the . 
relation between that charge and the attorney's fees for his 
services is wholly independent. 
In holding that the Brotherhood cannot arrange with an 
attorney to represent its members who may suffer industrial 
injuries when such members are referred to such attorney by a 
paid representative of the Brotherhood, the majority of this 
court have struck a lethal blow at one of the most vital func-
tions of the Brotherhood as a labor organization. It was 
largely through the effort of the Brotherhood that the Federal 
Employers Liability Act was enacted by Congress. This act 
has been amended many times at the suggestion of the Brother-
hood in order to accomplish its ultimate objective of extending 
the greatest possible measure of protection to railroad work-
men engaged in interstate commerce. It is obvious that this 
objective will be defeated unless the Brotherhood may now see 
that those members entitled to the protection afforded by the 
al't are inforIDf'd as to what to do to gain such protection. 
The first step in this direction is the selection of a competent 
) 
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attorney and the ascertainment of the facts which constitute 
the basis of the claim which the injured workman must assert 
in order to establish liability for his injuries. The Brother-
hood, through its legal aid department, has sought to provide 
the essential means necessary to secure to its members the 
protection afforded by the act. In so doing, it has done no 
more than many other, organizations which have employed 
counsel to protect the interests of their members. In my opin-
ion, such arrangements should not be condemned as unethical. 
The organization has an interest in the social and economic wel-
fare of its members. It cannot be denied that the social and 
economic welfare of every railroad workman and his depend-
ents is imperiled when he suffers injury or death in the course 
of his employment. Any concept of ethics which would deny 
to such an organization the right to suggest to such injured 
workman, or his dependents in case of his death, that he or 
they consult an attorney, is not worthy to be known by that 
name, and the mere fact that the organization has arranged 
with such attorney to handle cases for its members on a re-; 
duced fee basis should not render such arran~ement unethical. ' 
The foregoing considerations should dispose of this proceeding 
as a misguided venture in the field of legal ethics. Petitioners 
h.ave d?neno wrong in enteriIfg ~to the arran~ement in ques-
tIon WIth 'the Brotherhood, and m the handlmg of cases re-
ferred to them by representatives of the Brotherhood pursu-
ant to such arrangement. 
The proceeding against petitioners should therefore be dis-
missed. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1929 the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men undertook an investigation of the settlements and recov-
eries its members were receiving under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act for injuries incurred in the course of their em-
ployment. This investigation disclosed that the workers were 
not receiving the full benefits to which they were entitled 
because of their unfamiliarity with their rights and tneir 
frequent premature release of claims at the persuasion of rail-
road claims adjusters, together with incompetent and over-
priced legal assistance. It appeared that the situation would 
become worse because of a nation-wide drive to suppress am-
bulance chasing attorneys, who, incompetent or overreaching 
as they might be, frequently provided the only effective,check 
lIpon the activiti€'s of the claim!': adjusters. Accordingly, to 
protect its members both from precipitous settlement of claims 
) 
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and amblllAnlle chllsjn~ attorneys, the Brotherhood in 1930' 
established its Legal Aid Department to acqnaint memberi 
with their ri:rhts. and to investigate accidents to unearth the: 
necessary evidence. It was essential to these purposes to havf" 
i competent attorneYR available at reasonable fees. The Brother:',' 
i bood therefore secured the agreement of such attorneys:" 
tbrougbout the country to aceept the cases of injllred memben., i 
at a rt>asonable contingent fee, with the understanding th8t thee 
Brotherhood would recommend the attorneys to its injured i 
memhers who would be free to retain them or not. Thus: ,a' ,:i 
,:!roup with a legitimate need for competent legal assistance-.J 
in a specialized class of cases common to it, solicited the as-
sistance of qualified attorneys at reasonable fees. It is con-
ceded that members of the Brotherhood have thereby been 
able to secure adequate legal assistance in presenting their 
cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The issue 
if': whether the attorneys may participate in the Brotherhood's 
plan without violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Given the primary duty of. the legal profession to se""~ the 
public. the rules it establishes to p:overn itR professional ethics 
mnst be directed at the performance of that duty. Canons of 
ethics that would operate to deny to the railroad employees .~ 
__ t~~_~fl'~~p_!~!eK~L~ssist{l.ncethey need ,can be justified DnlY~ 
if such a denial is necessary to suppress professional condu.ct 
that in other cases would be injuriolls to tlte effective disch~!,ge.···· 
of the profession's duties to the public. 
It is contended that the Brotherhood's IIttorneys are violat-
ing rule 2 prohibiting the solicitation of professional employ-
ment and rule 3 prohibitiYlg acceptance of employment chan-
neled to the attorney by an organization "that for compensa-
tion controls. rlirects or influences such employment ... ;" 
It is neceRRary to consider against what evils these rules are 
directed and whether the operation of a plan such as that 
inaugurated by the Brotherhood involves the danger of such 
evils. 
These rules raise the familiar problems of advertising and 
ambulance chasing. Advertising has generally been discoun~ 
ten anced by the profession (American Bar Association Canon 
of Professional Ethics No. 27) as undignified and misleading. 
Advertising is hardly a measure of competence, given the 
profession's long standing disapproval of it. Clients who 
need legal assistance only rarely and are therefore inexperi-I 
enced in selecting counsel. may be induced by advertisin,:r to) 
select unsuitable counsel, with consequent injury not only to, 
/ 
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themselves but.to the reputation of the bar as a whole. (See 
Llewellyn, The Bars ' Troubles and Poultices-and Cures I, 
S Law and Contemporary Problems 104, 116.) 
Direct solicitation by ambulance chasing has led to serious 
abuses. "The testimony demonstrates very clearly the evils 
of the system of ambulance chasing. Competition between 
'ambulanee chasers,' and between 'ambulance chasers' and 
attorneys, in procuring cases, visits to homes and hospitals to 
pro('ure retainers at unseemly hours. and when the injured 
pt'rson or the members of his family were in no mental condi-
tion to ('nter ~nto contracts for the engagement of lawyers' 
st'rvices, division of fees with solicitors and procurers, pay-
ment of moneys to officials, doctors, and others for help in 
procuring cases, the use of photographs of checks of amounts 
of recov('ries had, and newspaper clippings showing successes 
in court. for the purpose of procuring clients, are all laid 
bare." (Matter of Gondelman, 225 App.Div. 462 [233 N.Y.S. 
343.346].) 
While rule 2 is directed against the solicitation of profes-
sional employment by an attorney, rule 3 is concerned with the 
lay intermediary between attorney and elient who seeks to 
profit from the solicitation, control, or infiuence of professional 
employment. .A ~rofit-motivated lay agency may exert vari-
ous harmfuJi1ifiuences on the profession. It may be more 
interested in th(' Jlrofittobe derived from legal business than 
in the best interests of the clients. Thus lay ambulanee 
chasers who solicit cases and thenselJ them to attorneys are 
apt to seek out, not the most competent attorney, but the one 
who will pay the most for a case. It may be more profitable· 
for professional ambulance chasers to operate ona high-vol-
ume low·return basis than to consider the best interests of 
each client. (See Nationwide War on " A mbulance Chasers," 
14 Amer. Bar Ass'n Journal 561, 563.) 
Again, a lay agency may ~ect its clients to attorneys who 
will in turn·recommend the services of the agency, even though 
the client may not need them. Thus a trust company in rec-
ommending attorneys to draft wills may favor those who 
recommend trust provisions. (See Cohen, Fiduciaries and 
Lawyers. 7 Ind.L.Jour. 295, 306-308, reprinted in Costigan, 
Cases on the Legal Profession [2d ed.] 364-366.) It may not 
be in the client's interest to incorporate trnst provisions in 
his will. but if the attorney is receiving the business throng!) 
th,. rpC'ommf'ndation of a tT1U!t C'ompany. hI" may bp inflnt>nced 
by that fact. A rule prohibitlllg the acceptunce of basiuess 
/ 
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channeled to him by a party whose interest in his services may 
be adverse to those of the clients is justified to insure that the 
clients' interests are kept paramount. 
The lay intermediary may also interfere with the direct 
attorney-client relationship. Thus, if an association retains 
an attorney to advise on problems presented by the members, 
and those problems are communicated to the attorney through 
the association, he may be constrained to give advice in the 
light, not of all the facts, but of only the information thought 
relevant by the member who requested advice of the associa-
tion. (See American Bar Association, Opinions of the Com--~ 
mittee on Professional Ethics and Grievances [1947] No. 98, 
p.212.) 
There are situations, however, when an attorney's associa. i 
tion with a lay organization fulfills a legitimate interest of i 
the organization or its members, and presents no risk of eon· 
flicting interests or other abuses. Such arrangements may be 
tolerated even when the lay agency is actively engaged in' 
soliciting business. Liability insurance companies provide 
in their policies that they will arrange for the defense of any 
action brought against the policy holder and demand that they 
shall have the right to do so. By advertising their policies 
they solicit the legal business that arises from their po . 
holders' activities. At the same time they arrange with quali· 
fied experts in personal.injury litigation to represent them 
and their policy holderS in any litigation that arises. These 
attorneys agree to this representation, knowing that their 
professional employment will arise from the active solicitation 
of business by the insurance companies. Such conduct on the 
part of the attorneys is expressly permitted by rule 3, for 
it is accepted as serving the public good. Liability insurance 
is socially desirable; policy holders and the companies are 
entitled to adequate legal representation; the sensible way to 
provide such representation is through reguJarly.retained 
experts. There is no risk that clients will be led to incompe:-
tent attorneys, and the attorneys are in a position to deal 
directly with the client when the need for legal services arises. 
Moreover, the interests of the insurance company and the 
client will ordinarily coincide, so that there is little danger 
that the insurance company's attorney will be placed in_~~_ 
position of representing conflicting interests. It has been-; 
thought better to make adjustments for the occasional ease : 
where the interests of the policy holder and the company con.-; 
flict (see O'M..orr()1lJ v. Borad, 27 Cal.2d 794, 798-799 (167 P.2dJ 
l 
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483,163 A.L.R. 894]), than to prohibit the practice altogether. 
The Brotherhood's attorneys bear much the same relation 
to it as the insurance defense attorneys do to the insurance 
companies. In neither situation do the attorneys themselves 
solicit professional employment or pay the organizations in-
volved for securing it, even though they reap the benefits of 
the activities of the respective organizations that bring pro-
fessional employment to them. Rule 3 recognizes that it is 
the financial interest of the insurance company that Tenders 
the employment of the company's expert attorneys for its 
policy holders "necessary and proper for the protection of 
such financial interest. " It illustrates a situation where con-
siderations of policy make clear that there are no ethical ob-
jections to the channeling of professional employment to ex-
perts. Rule 3 and the policy underlying it do uot close the 
door to similar practices in other situations where policy 
considerations are as strong or stronger in favor of the pro-
priety of group action. Rule 3 requires a financial interest 
in the outcome of litigation to justify referrals only when the 
association controls, directs, or influences such referrals for 
compensation. It is thus designed to preclude attorneys from 
dcceptingeJ!lployment from organizations engaged in the 
business of providiiiiTegaI alivice'for 'proii-elt -aoesnot prO'-
hibit the acceptance of employment where the referring asso-
dation makes the referrals; notfor'compensation, but solely 
fa help its members secure legal assistance. . 
Bar association committees on professional ethics have l'eC-
ognized that the protection of various social or group interests 
justifies attorney participation in plans designed to protect 
the legitimate interests of the group, even though the attorney 
is retained by a group that recommends his services to its 
members or otbers on problems they have in common. Thus 
it bas been considered proper for the National Lawyers Com-
mittee of the American Liberty League publicly to offer to 
defend the constitutional rights of those threatened by New 
Deal legislation. "These issues transcend the range of pro-
fessional ethics." (American Bar Association, Opinion!! of 
th" Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances (1947) 
No. 148. pp. 307, 311.) Similarly, the same organization has 
approved the use of expert counsel by trade organization~ to 
Il!!sist their members in conducting their bllSines.~es within the 
framework of increasing governmental regulation. (Opinion 
No 168. p. 340: see, ahlO. Oninion No 27~. P 569: Questions 
and Answers of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the 
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New York County Lawyers Association, Q~estion 47, reprinted~' 
in Costigan, Cases on the Legal Profession [2d ed.) 866; 
Relation of Lawyers and Lawful Trade Organizations mid~· 
other Organizations, Opinion of the Committee on Professional :;:, 
Ethics of the New York County Lawyers Association, reprinted" 
in Costigan, I1tpra, 360.) These opinions have recognized that.· 
in those cases where the members of lay associations have . 
problems in common, it is proper for their associations -to-
arrange for competent legal assistance, even though to carry. 
out the plans the associations must make known to their" 
members the identity of competent counsel. Thus a bankers' 
association may recommend its expert counsel to its members 
. when they are faced with legal problemspeeuliar to the bank-
ing business, or a medical association may adopt a similar i 
procedure for the benefit of its members. 
It does not follow that an attorney may participate in • 
plan by which the association itself engages in the practice 
of law .. ,,' [Als the term is generally understood, the practice 
of law is the doing and performing (of] services in a court 
of justice in any matter depending therein throughout its 
various stages and in conformity with the adopted rules of, 
procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and~. 
eounsel and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts . 
by which legal rights are secured although such matterm&1, 
or may not be depending in court.'" (People Y. Mercktm', 
Proteditl8 Corp., 189 Cal 531, 535 [209 P. 363].) Corporations 
and associations of unlicensed persons are denied the right to 
practice law: 
"The essential element underlying the relation of attorney 
and client is that of trust and confidence of the highest degree 
growing out of the employment and entering 'into the perform-
ance of every duty which the attorney owes to his elient in 
the course of such employment. It is the existence of this 
essential element as the basis of said relation which has ,called 
into being the various statutory regulations governing the 
admission of attorneys and counselors at law and which em-
body certain requirements of character, integrity and learning 
as the prerequisites of such admission to the right and privi. 
lege of practicing law. It is the possession or reputation for 
the possession of these personal qualifications which consti-
tutes. as a rule, the main inducement for the formation of the 
personal and confidential relation of attorney and client. The 
intf'Tvention of R corporation hf'hvPf'n the membership it se-
cW'es and the attorneys it employs, which corporation can in 
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and of itself possess none of these qualifications, obviously 
leaves out of view the necessity for their existence. The essen-
tial relation of trust and confidence. between attorney and 
client cannot be said to arise where the attorney is employed, 
not by the client, but by some corporatjon which has under-
taken to furnish its members with legal advice, counsel and 
professional services. The attorney in such a case owes his 
first allegiance to his immediate employer, the corporation, 
and owes, at most, but an incidental, secondary and divided 
loyalty to the clientele of the corporation." (PeopZe v. Mer· 
chants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 539 [209 P. 363] ; see, 
also, In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479 [92 N.E. 15, 
139 Am.St.Rep. 839, 19 Ann.Cas. 879, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 55]; 
Bulleit, The Automobile Clubs and the Courts, 5 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 22. ) 
In the present case, however, it is not contended that the 
Brotherhood is engaged in the practice of law, and there is 
no evidence of evils that the Rules of Professional Conduct are 
intended to guard against. The Brotherhood's plan in no way 
lowers the dignity of the profession. It does not lead the I 
railroad employees to incompetent counsel. There is no con-
flict in the interests of the Brotherhood and its members, and 
therefore no danger that the attorneysreeommended by the 
Brotherhood will be faced with conflicting allegiances. There 
is no interference with the direct attorney-client relationship; I 
the members are free to retain or reject the attorneys recom-
mended by the Brotherhood and they deal directly with the /1 
attorneys themselves. 
Since there is no issue of misconduct other than participaiion ... 
in the basic plan of the Brotherhood, I concur in the judgment 
dismissing the proceeding. 
I 
